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Abstract
Under the principle of the Failing Firm Defense (FFD) a merger that
would be blocked due to its harmful effect on competition could be nev-
ertheless allowed when (i) the acquired firm is actually failing, (ii) there
is no less anti-competitive alternative purchase, (iii) absent the merger,
the assets to be acquired would exit the market. This paper focuses on
potential anti-competitive effects of a myopic application of the third re-
quirement by studying consequences of a horizontal merger on entry in
a Cournot oligopoly with a failing firm. If the merger is blocked, entry
occurs and consumer welfare is bigger when the industry is highly concen-
trated because gains due to augmented competition exceed losses due to
shortage of output.
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1 Introduction
According to the competition law in most developed countries, mergers are
illegal when creating or strengthening dominant positions.1 A merger that
would be blocked due to its adverse effect on competition could be nevertheless
allowed if the firm to be acquired is failing under the so-called Failing Firm
Defense (FFD).
The FFD is well established in the U.S. case-law and is included in the
department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission. The FFD was first ap-
plied in the case of International Shoe’s acquisition of a financially troubled
competitor, McElwain Company: the Court allowed the merger after verify-
ing that there was little direct competition between the two companies. The
principle was developed further in the case of Citizen Publishing Co., when the
Court rejected a merger with a distressed newspaper company by stating tighter
prerequisites for the defence to be accepted. Preserved the two conditions men-
tioned for International Shoe, the grave probability of business failure faced
by the company and the lack of alternative purchasers, a third requirement
was added: the prospects of reorganization through receivership or bankruptcy
proceedings must be "dim or non-existent".
In the EU the case of Kali und Salz/MdK/Treuhand (Case No IV/M.308)
and the more recent one in the chemicals sector Basf/Eurodiol/Pantochim (Case
No COMP/M.2314) gave the opportunity to the European Commission of set-
ting out extensively the three requirements which must be met to apply the
concept of a rescue merger:
• the acquired undertaking would immediately go bankrupt if not bought
out by another undertaking (i);
• there is no less anti-competitive alternative purchase (ii);
1See Farrell and Shapiro (1990) and Motta (2004) for a general discussion of the effects of
mergers on competition.
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• the assets to be acquired would be exit the market if not taken over by
another firm (iii).2
First, the Court of Commerce confirmed that both undertakings would
have to be declared bankrupt if a buyer for them were not approved. Sec-
ond, although a number of competitors were contacted, after a close look at
the business activities of the failing undertakings no other firm apart BASF
was interested in submitting offer. Third and, as we will see, more interesting
for the purpose of this paper, the Commission stated that the assets of the
failing firms would have definitely exited the market if the merger had been
blocked because an immediate takeover by a third party seemed to be unlikely
because "a shutdown of the production would cause additional costs for new
catalysts if the plant was restarted". Moreover, the availability of a qualified
workforce was crucial for the operation of the chemical plant; the Commission
noted that "as parts of qualified workforce have already left and others will
certainly do so after bankruptcy is declared, the incentives for any investor
to take up business after bankruptcy are fairly low". The Commission stated
that absent the merger the exit of assets and production capacities of Eurodiol
and Pantochim would have caused a significant capacity shortage for products
which were already offered under very tight capacity constraints. At least for
a considerable period of time, compensation for this capacity reduction would
have been impossible. As a consequence, a strong price increases was supposed
to emerge given the capacity constraints and the inelastic demand for those
products. The Commission concluded that the deterioration of the competitive
structure resulting from the merger would have been less significant if it was
allowed and in 2001 BASF was permitted to acquire Eurodiol and Pantochim,
which were in financial distress.
While the literature on mergers generally is very large, to our knowledge
2See the contribution in OECD Roundtables, "Failing Firm Defense", OECD/GD(96)23,
Competition Policy Roundtables, and Failing Firm in Light of Global Competition.
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there are only two papers analysing the FFD specifically. Mason and Weeds
(2003) argue that rescue mergers are desirable to encourage ex-ante entry. More
exactly, even if mergers lead to a more concentrated market structure and con-
sequently lower consumer surplus, the possibility of mergers in times of financial
distress increases the willingness of firms to enter the industry, therefore increas-
ing consumer surplus in the long run. They conclude that a more lenient merger
policy, i.e. allowing merger at an early stage of financial distress when the fail-
ure is not certain, can lead benefits to consumers. Persson (2005) analyses the
welfare consequences of the FFD, by focusing on the ex-post efficiency of sales
of the failing firm’s assets. He finds that a smaller or a noncompetitor buyer
may not be the socially preferred buyer and he calls for an improvement of the
auction-selling procedure. While the first paper analyses the optimal degree of
policy leniency, being thereby related to the requirement (i) of FFD’s law, and
the second one deals with the optimal design of the auction for the failing firm,
thereby concerning the requirement (ii), the current paper mainly concentrates
on potential anti-competitive effects produced by a myopic application of the
requirement (iii).
The idea that an anticompetitive merger is better than a company closing
its doors has intuitive appeal. If the failing firm’s assets could be expected to
remain the market in other hands -either a somehow rejuvenated original firm,
a new firm, or even a firm with a smaller market share- then their acquisition
by a leading firm would raise conventional antitrust concerns. Instead, if they
would otherwise leave the market, the effect of the acquisition is to increase
industry capacity. In our paper we suppose that the three requirements are
satisfied, hence we expect that the additional capacity increases output and
lowers price compared to the case of blocked merger. Yet, we argue that a
trade-off between preservation of assets and entry deterrence should be taken
into account. Indeed, allowing the merger is equivalent to decrease the cost of
internal capacity expansion by the acquiring firm.
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It has been given evidence (Spence, 1979) that in oligopolistic markets lead-
ing firms may maintain excess capacity as a deterrent to potential entrants or to
discipline smaller rivals. Excess capacity permits existing firms to expand out-
put and reduce price when entry is threatened, thereby reducing the prospective
profits of the new entrant which operates on the residual demand curve.
The basic idea of our analysis is that the merger can give enough capacity
to the acquiring firm to deter entry of new competitors.3 In that case, even
if the three requirements of FFD are satisfied, we ask whether the Antitrust
Authority (AA) should allow the merger to prevent shortage of output or block
it to preserve competition. We assume that the AA assess the merger accord-
ing to the maximization of consumer welfare (Motta and Vasconcelos, 2005).
We consider a symmetric oligopoly à la Cournot where an unexpected exoge-
nous shock makes one firm failing. A merger between the failing firm and one
of the other firms is then proposed: absent the merger, assets of the former
are assumed to exit the market. All potential buyers are symmetric, hence
no less anti-competitive alternative purchase is available. We study effects of
the merger on entry and we find that it occurs when the merger is blocked,
whereas no entry may occur when the merger is allowed. A forward looking
AA which takes into account the above effects may find that the consumer sur-
plus is greater by blocking the merger rather than allowing it for, under some
parametric conditions, gains due to lower concentration outdo losses due to
shortage of output.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The formal model is
laid out in Section 2. Section 3 studies effects of the horizontal merger on
entry. Section 4 establishes conditions under which the merger should be either
allowed or blocked on the basis of consumer surplus. Section 5 concludes.
3We follow Dixit (1980), who assumes that entry decision depends on whether the entrant
ends up with positive profits in the Cournot equilibrium. Our approach differs for we suppose
that, before the competition in quantities, the incumbent can expand output also through the
acquisition of the failing firm assets and not only through strategic capacity investment.
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2 The model
In this section we consider a symmetric Cournot oligopoly where the number of
incumbents is determined by a set-up entry cost and we describe the timing of
the model. We then introduce an unexpected exogenous shock that makes one
firm failing. Finally, we study the new Cournot equilibria when an horizontal
merger between the failing firm and one of the remaining firms is either allowed
or blocked.
2.1 Symmetric Cournot Oligopoly
At t = −1, m firms incur a fixed set-up cost F to enter an industry with linear
market demand
p (Q) = a− bQ, (1)
where Q =
∑m
i=1 qi is the industry output. Let the slope of the demand curve
b be equal to 1. Total costs of production of the representative firm i are given
by
C = cqi + rKi + F , (2)
where c ≥ 0 is the constant marginal cost for output qi and r is the constant
marginal cost for capacity Ki. We assume that a unit of capacity is needed
to produce a unit of output and, following Dixit (1980), we anticipate that at
equilibrium Ki = qi. Profit of the firm i is thus as follows:a−
∑
j =i
qj + qi
− (c+ r)
 qi − F . (3)
The firms choose their output levels simultaneously to maximize (3). Due to
symmetry of total production costs, optimal quantities are equal for all firms
and given by a−c−r
m+1 . The associated optimal level of profit net of F is
pi∗ (m) =
(
a− c− r
m+ 1
)2
. (4)
Assumption 1 F < F ≤ F ,
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where F = pi∗ (n+ 1), F = pi∗ (n) and n ≥ 2. Assumption 1 states that
only n entrants make nonnegative profits: a symmetric oligopoly à la Cournot
arises.4 Equilibrium quantity of each firm is
K =
a− c− r
n+ 1
, (5)
and industry output is
Q−1 = nK. (6)
Assumption 2 0 ≤ r < r,
where r = 10−3
√
10
10 (a− c). Assumption 2 states that the capacity cost r is
low with respect to the market size and implies K > 0.5
Before proceeding, we describe the timing of the model, which is shown in
Figure 1.
t
n-firm 
Cournot 
oligopoly
-1 0 1
Unexpected
exogenous
shock
n-1-firm 
Cournot 
oligopoly
Merger 
proposal
AA 
decision
Entry 
decision
Cournot
competition
Capacity
choice
Figure 1: Timing of the model.
1. At t = −1, the market structure is a symmetric n-firm oligopoly à la
Cournot.
2. Between t = −1 and t = 0, an unexpected exogenous shock makes one
firm failing. The failing firm and one of the remaining n−1 firms advance
4Throughout the paper we assume that a firm enters the industry when its profit is zero.
An ε reasoning may be used to make the argument more appealing.
5 Increasing the upper bound on r to a−c complicates computations without adding interest
to our results.
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a merger.6 Finally, the AA decides whether to allow the merger or block
it on the basis of consumer surplus. Absent the merger, assets of the
failing firm are assumed to exit the market.
3. At t = 0, the firms compete simultaneously over quantities.
4. Between t = 0 and t = 1, m′ ≥ 0 potential entrants can build and the
incumbents can enlarge capacity. The following first stage of a two-stage
game is played: before building the capacity the potential entrants choose
whether to enter.
5. A t = 1, the second stage of the game is played: after observing the choice
of the entrants, the firms compete à la Cournot.
We compute equilibria by assuming that parameters of the games are com-
mon knowledge and by restricting our attention to pure strategies.
2.2 Failing Firm
As anticipated before between t = −1 and t = 0 an unexpected exogenous
shock makes one firm failing.7 The failing firm decides to merge with one of
the remaining n− 1.
We analyze the Cournot game at t = 0 by taking into account that the firms
are capacity constrained, because the potential for producing can be expanded
only after t = 0. We consider separately the case where the merger is allowed
and where it is blocked.
6Profits of the merged firm are higher than the sum of profits made by the two incumbents
when the failing firm exits the market. Furthermore, the latter is assumed to make zero profits
in the case of failure, hence it prefers to merge even if a big fraction of the pie is left to the
other firm. As a consequence, the merger is profitable for both parties. See Perry and Porter
(1985) for a discussion on incentives to merge due to efficiency gains.
7An explanation of the failure compatible with the model could be the following: if the
firm is highly leveraged, an unforeseen idiosyncratic financial shock can make it unable to
repay interests on debt.
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In the former case, there are n− 2 no-merged firms with capacity K, while
the merged firm can produce up to 2K.
Lemma 1 When the merger is allowed, the Cournot equilibrium at t = 0 is
such that each no-merged firm produces K and the merged firm produces
3(a−c)+r(n−2)
2(n+1) ∈
(
K, 2K
)
if n < n1,
2K if n ≥ n1,
(7)
where n1 =
a−c−2r
r
. Industry output is
QA0 =

(2n−1)(a−c)−r(n−2)
2(n+1) if n < n1,
nK if n ≥ n1.
(8)
Formal proofs of this and all next results are in the Appendix. If the industry
is sufficiently concentrated (i.e. n < n1), the merged firm prefers not to sell all
the capacity with the aim of increasing the market price, because it maintains
a significant demand share even if it restricts output. As a consequence, QA0 is
lower than industry output before the failure. For higher n the above raising
price strategy turns out to be not profitable and the merged firm increases
production up to the capacity.
If the merger is blocked, assets of the failing firm are assumed to be lost:
n− 1 symmetric firms remain in the industry with capacity equal to K.
Lemma 2 When the merger is blocked the Cournot equilibrium at t = 0 is
such that each firm produces K. Industry output is
QB0 = (n− 1)K. (9)
Symmetric Cournot equilibrium would require n − 1 remaining firms to
increase the production to a−c
n
. Such a solution is however not feasible because
of the capacity constraints, hence the equilibrium strategy is to produce as much
as possible. Notice that QA0 > Q
B
0 : industry output is higher if the merger is
allowed.
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3 Entry Deterrence
In this section we study the two-stage game between incumbents and entrants
after t = 0 by considering separately the case where the merger is allowed and
the case where it is blocked. Output costs c + r per unit for the potential
entrants because they incur both the production cost c and the capacity cost
r. On the contrary, incumbents incur the latter only if they decide to produce
more than the capacity. The entrants also bear the fixed set-up cost F . The
game is solved by backward induction. We proceed in the following steps:
• we compute second stage optimal quantities and we verify whether the
incumbents decide to enlarge capacity by analyzing the case where m′
entrants decide to enter;
• we check how many new competitors decide to enter at the first stage.
Lemma 3 When the merger is allowed the SPNE at t = 1 depends on F and
n. If 
 F < F ≤ F0,n < n0, (10)
where F0 =
(
3(a−c)−r(n+4)
3(n+1)
)2
and n0 =
√
12r(a−c)−11r2−3r
2r < n1, then
1. only one firm decides to enter by producing 3(a−c)−r(n+4)3(n+1) ;
2. output of each no-merged incumbent is K;
3. the merged incumbent holds excess capacity by producing 3(a−c)+r(2n−1)3(n+1) ∈(
K, 2K
)
.
Industry output is
QA1 =
3n (a− c)− r (2n− 1)
3 (n+ 1)
. (11)
If F0 < F ≤ F , then
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1. no entry occurs;
2. output of each no-merged incumbent is
a−c−2r
n
∈
(
K, 2K
)
for n < n1,
K for n ≥ n1.
3. the merged one produces
a−c+r(n−2)
n
∈
(
K, 2K
)
for n < n1,
2K for n ≥ n1.
Industry output is
QA1 =

(n−1)(a−c)−r(n−2)
n
for n < n1,
nK for n ≥ n1.
(12)
Figure 2 depicts in the plane (n, F ) the two areas where entry occurs and
where it does not.
NO
 ENTRY
ENTRY
F
0F
F
2 1n0n n
F
Figure 2: Entry choice when the merger is allowed.
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An incumbent with huge capacity due to merger is present which reduces
potential entrants’ profits. Nevertheless note that the merged incumbent’s pro-
duction is increasing in n: for low n prospective profits are sufficiently high to
ensure entry of one competitor if the set-up cost F is small. For higher F none
decides to enter: the no-merged incumbents have the possibility of producing
more by enlarging the capacity if n < n1, while they are not able to enlarge it
if n ≥ n1.
Lemma 4 When the merger is blocked the SPNE at t = 1 is such that only
one firm decides to enter by producing K and the incumbents produce K
as well, thereby not expanding the capacity. Industry output is
QB1 = nK. (13)
The symmetric incumbents produce up to the installed capacities and find
it not profitable to enlarge them. This enables a new firm to enter and get
a market share such that profits are sufficiently high to recover the set-up
cost F . Blocking the merger ensures that a new competitor meets exactly the
excess demand brought about by the failure of an incumbent at t = 0. Indeed,
QB1 = Q−1: the industry output is at the same level as before the failing firm’s
exit.
Lemmas 3 and 4 show the controversial effect at t = 1 of allowing the merger:
holding excess capacity permits the merged firm to expand output at a lower
marginal cost and reduce price when entry is threatened, thereby involving a
reduction of entrants’ prospective profits. If (10) does not hold, blocking the
merger is the only mean for profits of one entrant to be sufficient to recover the
entry cost.
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4 Consumer Welfare
The analysis proceeds by checking whether the merger must be either allowed
or blocked on the basis of consumer welfare. One-period surplus is defined as
follows: ∫ Q
0
(a−Q) dQ− pQ (14)
and it amounts to Q2/2, thereby being an increasing function of the industry
output.
We compute the surplus gap at t = 0, which we denote with ∆S0, between
the situation where the merger is allowed and the one where it is blocked. In
symbols
∆S0 =
(
QA0
)2
2
−
(
QB0
)2
2
, (15)
where recall thatQ
A(B)
0 represents the industry output at t = 0 when the merger
is allowed (blocked). We get
∆S0 =


1
8
(a−c+rn)[(4n−3)(a−c)−r(3n−4)]
(n+1)2
for n < n1,
2n−1
2 K
2
for n ≥ n1.
(16)
which is positive.
Remark 1 At t = 0, consumer surplus is higher when the merger is allowed.
Allowing the merger gives a benefit in terms of consumer surplus because
it prevents shortage of output of the failing firm. Absent the merger, demand
would exceed significantly supply, hence price would increase involving a con-
sumer surplus reduction. The requirement (iii) of the FFD’s law is intended to
avoid such a situation.
Yet, we argue that the above benefit must be traded off with a potential
loss due to entry deterrence. To this aim, we compute the value
∆S1 =
(
QB1
)2
2
−
(
QA1
)2
2
, (17)
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which represents the surplus gap at t = 1 between the scenario where the merger
is blocked and the one where it is allowed. If (10) holds, we get
∆S1 = −r
6
6n (a− c)− (5n− 1) r
3 (n+ 1)
, (18)
which is negative; by contrast, if F0 < F ≤ F
∆S1 =

[(a−c)−r(n+2)][(2n2−1)(a−c)−r(2n2−n−2)]
2n2(n+1)2
> 0 for n < n1,
0 for n ≥ n1.
(19)
Remark 2 At t = 1, if (10) holds consumer surplus is lower when the merger
is blocked; if F0 < F ≤ F it is higher for n < n1 and equal for n ≥ n1.
A low cost of entry combined with high industry concentration makes entry
being never deterred: allowing the merger gives a welfare benefit not only at t =
0 (as pointed out in Remark 1), but also at t = 1. Otherwise, the merged firm
deters entry and the aforementioned trade-off arises: if the merger is allowed
consumer surplus is higher at t = 0 for there is no shortage of output, but it is
lower at t = 1 for entry is deterred and the merged firm holds capacity in excess,
thereby reducing industry output.8 Nonetheless, the trade-off disappears with
relatively low industry concentration because the merged firm is exploiting the
entire capacity 2K, thereby compensating exactly the absence of a potential
entrant which would have produced K at equilibrium.
Last step of the analysis consists of going through the above trade-off to
determine whether the FFD law prescriptions may reduce welfare of consumers,
contrary to their purposes. To this aim we introduce the following function
D (n) = ∆S1 −∆S0, (20)
which represents the overall, i.e. at both t = 0 and t = 1, surplus gap between
the situation where the merger is blocked and the situation where it is allowed.
8More exactly, for n < n1 the merged incumbent restricts production below its capacity,
whereas the no-merged incumbents expand their one. The former effect dominates the latter,
so that industry output is higher when the merger is blocked: QB1 > Q
A
1 .
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We have already noted that if (10) holds ∆S1 is negative, hence D (n) < 0.
In such a case allowing the merger is better for consumers because it permits
assets of the failing firm remain into the market without raising barriers to
entry. We now turn to the situation where F0 < F ≤ F . Recall that ∆S1 = 0
if n ≥ n1, therefore D (n) < 0 and allowing the merger is better for consumer
because it does not involve any output reduction at t = 1 compared to the case
of blocked merger. If n < n1, in contrast, ∆S1 > 0 and the sign of D (n) is
studied in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Blocking the merger is better from the consumer welfare view
point if 
 n < 3,F0 < F ≤ F . (21)
Otherwise, allowing the merger is better from the consumer welfare view point.
Under the FFD law gain represented by ∆S0 would induce to allow the
merger. Yet, when the entry cost is relatively high the merged firm deters
entry. Moreover, the more the market is concentrated, the bigger is the output
restriction (as it occurs when the merger is allowed) compared to the situation of
fully exploitation of industry capacity (as it occurs when the merger is blocked)
because a raising price strategy is highly profitable when the merged incumbent
owns a big market share. In this case the merger should be stopped in order to
preserve competition in the industry.
5 Concluding Remarks
According to the third requirement of the FFD law, allowing a horizontal merger
gives a consumer welfare gain compared to the case where the merger is blocked
and the failing firm’s assets exit the market.
This paper argues that a trade-off between preservation of assets and (long-
run) potential entry deterrence should be taken into account. Indeed, per-
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mitting an incumbent to own huge capacity as a consequence of the merger
augments the height of entry barriers because the merged firm can increase
output at a lower marginal cost. This reduces prospective profits of new en-
trants and, when entry is actually deterred, it may produce harmful effects on
the consumer welfare.
We find that losses due to reduced competition dominates gains due to no
shortage of output when the following two conditions are satisfied: (1) entry
cost is relatively high, so that the merged firm deters entry, (2) market is
highly concentrated so that it can conveniently exercises its market power and
increases the price by retaining a significant amount of capacity in excess. In
such a case, a strictly application of third requirement would lead to a lower
consumer surplus than what it would be obtained by blocking the merger.
This result suggests that there might be scope for improving the current
design of the FFD law and calls for more stringent conditions which must be
met to apply the concept of a rescue merger. Even if we believe that the simple
framework we employ is sufficient to state our results with robustness, further
research in this area should extend the current analysis to an infinite horizon
and by considering asymmetric firms with respect to production costs so as to
fully endogenize the cause of the failure and the subsequent merger process.
6 Appendix
(Lemma 1). The merged firm solves the following problem:
max
qM
[
a− c−
(
n−2∑
k
qIk + qM
)]
qM (22)
s.t. qM ≤ 2K.
where
∑
k q
Ik and qM are the quantities produced by the no-merged incumbents
and the merged one, respectively. The solution to (22) is qM =
a−
∑
qI−c
2 .
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Simultaneously, the no-merged firm Ik solves the following problem:
max
qI
[
a− c−
(
n−3∑
h=k
qIh + qM + qIk
)]
qIk (23)
s.t. qIk ≤ K.
The objective function of the problem (23) is increasing in qIk ≤ a−
∑
qIh−qM−c
2 .
This upper bound is higher than K, hence the solution to (23) is qIk = K.
By substituting this value in the merged firm reaction function, we get qM =
3(a−c)+r(n−2)
2(n+1) which is higher thanK for any n and lower than 2K if n <
a−c−2r
r
.
The result in the text follows.
(Lemma 2). The firm Ik solves the following problem:
max
qI
[
a− c−
(
n−2∑
h=k
qIh + qIk
)]
qIk (24)
s.t. qIk ≤ K.
The first derivative of the objective function is positive if and only if qIk <
a−
∑
qIh−c
2 . This upper bound is higher than K, hence the solution to (24) is
qIk = K.
(Lemma 3). We solve the game backwards by proceeding in three steps which
we described in the text. For ease of exposition in this and next proposition we
present just the equilibrium cases: the complete proof is available on request.
Recall that if the merger is allowed there are n − 2 symmetric incumbents Ik
with capacity K and a merged incumbent with capacity 2K.
(a) We study last stage optimal quantities when m′ entrants Ek′ decide to
enter. The entrants reaction function is as follows:
R
E
k′
A =
a− c− r −
(
qM +
∑
k q
Ik +
∑
h′ =k′ q
E
h′
)
2
. (25)
where c, r, qM and
∑
k q
Ik are defined above and qE is the quantity produced
by each entrant. The n− 2 no-merged incumbents’ reaction functions RIkA are
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symmetric:
a−c−r−(qM+
∑
h =k q
Ih+
∑
k′ q
E
k′ )
2 if 0 ≤ qM +
∑
h=k q
Ih +
∑
k′ q
E
k′ < (n− 1)K,
K if (n− 1)K ≤ qM +∑h=k qIh +∑k′ qEk′ ≤ (n−1)(a−c)+2rn+1 ,
a−c−(qM+
∑
h=k q
Ih+
∑
k′ q
E
k′ )
2 if q
M +
∑
h=k q
Ih +
∑
k′ q
E
k′ > (n−1)(a−c)+2r
n+1 .
(26)
Finally the merged incumbent reaction function is
RM =

a−c−r−(
∑
k
qIk+
∑
k′ q
E
k′ )
2 if 0 ≤
∑
k q
Ik +
∑
k′ q
E
k′ < (n− 3)K,
2K if (n− 3)K ≤∑k qIk +∑k′ qEk′ ≤ (n−3)(a−c)+4rn+1 ,
a−c−(
∑
k
qIk+
∑
k′ q
E
k′ )
2 if
∑
k q
Ik +
∑
k′ q
E
k′ > (n−3)(a−c)+4r
n+1 .
(27)
Let x > K be the output of no-merged incumbents which decide to produce
more than the capacity. Let y = K be the output of no-merged incumbents
which decide to produce exactly the capacity. Finally, let z < K be the out-
put of no-merged incumbents which decide to produce less than the capacity.
Moreover, let X > 2K, Y = 2K and Z < 2K be the corresponding output of
the merged incumbent.
We compute last stage optimal quantities with entry for the situation where
all n − 2 no-merged incumbents produce y, the merged incumbent produces
either Y or Z and the entrants qE. In the former case the solution is defined
by the following system:
y = K,
qE = a−c−r−Y,Z−(n−2)y−(m
′−1)qE
2 ,
Y = 2K,
(28)
where the reaction function y appears n − 2 times and qE appears m′ times.
We get qE = 1
m′+1K. To have the no-merged incumbents producing y, ex-
pression (26) requires (n− 1)K ≤ Y + (n− 3) y + m′ y
m′+1 ≤
(n−1)(a−c)+2r
n+1 ,
i.e. n ≥ m′(a−c)−r(2m′+1)
r(m′+1) . To have the merged incumbent producing Y ex-
pression (27) requires (n− 3)K ≤ (n− 2) y + m′ y
m′+1 ≤
(n−3)(a−c)+4r
n+1 , i.e.
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n ≥ (2m′+1)(a−c)−r(3m′+2)
r(m′+1) . Given that
(2m′+1)(a−c)−r(3m′+2)
r(m′+1) >
m′(a−c)−r(2m′+1)
r(m′+1) ,
we conclude that this solution is admissible if n ≥ (2m′+1)(a−c)−r(3m′+2)
r(m′+1) .
If the merged incumbent produces Z, the system is

y = K,
qE = a−c−r−Y,Z−(n−2)y−(m
′−1)qE
2 ,
Z = a−c−(n−2)y−m
′qE
2 .
(29)
We get qE = Z − r and Z = 3(a−c)+r[m′(n+1)+n−2](m′+2)(n+1) . Note that Z < 2K ⇔
n < (2m
′+1)(a−c)−r(3m′+1)
r(m′+1) . In such a case, expression (26) requires (n− 1)K ≤
Z + (n− 3) y + m′ (Z − r) ≤ (n−1)(a−c)+2r
n+1 , which is always true if m
′ ≥ 1,
and true for n ≥ n1 if m′ = 0; expression (27) requires (n− 2) y+m′ (Z − r) >
(n−3)(a−c)+4r
n+1 , which is satisfied if n <
(2m′+1)(a−c)−r(3m′+2)
r(m′+1) . Note that
(2m′+1)(a−c)−r(3m′+2)
r(m′+1) =
n1 ifm
′ = 0: we conclude that this solution is admissible for n < (2m
′+1)(a−c)−r(3m′+2)
r(m′+1)
if m′ ≥ 1 and not admissible if m′ = 0.
We study the situation where m′ = 0, all n − 2 no-merged incumbents
produce x and the merged one produces Z. The system is x =
a−c−r−Z−(n−3)x
2 ,
Z = a−c−(n−2)x2 .
(30)
We have x = a−c−2r
n
and Z = x+ r. These two values are acceptable if n < n1.
Moreover we need 0 ≤ qM +∑h =k qIh = x+r+(n− 3)x < (n− 1)K, which is
verified if n < n1, and
∑
k q
Ik = (n− 2)x > (n−3)(a−c)+4r
n+1 , which is also verified
if n < n1. This solution is thus admissible if n < n1.
From the above analysis we infer that ifm′ entrants decide to enter, then the
value of third stage optimal quantities depends on n. If n < (2m
′+1)(a−c)−r(3m′+2)
r(m′+1) ,
then all no-merged incumbents produce exactly their capacity K, output of
the merged incumbent is Z = 3(a−c)+r[m
′(n+1)+n−2]
(m′+2)(n+1) and each entrant produces
qE = Z − r = 3(a−c)−r(n+4)(m′+2)(n+1) ; the entrants’ profit is
(
3(a−c)−r(n+4)
(m′+2)(n+1)
)2
− F .
Nonetheless, ifm′ = 0, then all no-merged incumbents produce a−c−2r
n
> K and
the merged incumbent produces a−c+r(n−2)
n
< 2K. If n ≥ (2m′+1)(a−c)−r(3m′+2)
r(m′+1) ,
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then both no-merged incumbents and the merged one produce exactly their ca-
pacity, K and 2K, respectively; each entrant produces qE = 1
m′+1K and its
profit is
(
1
m′+1K
)2
− F .
(b) We deduce that after observing that m′ entrants will enter, only the
no-merged incumbents when m′ = 0 decide to expand the available capacity at
the second stage of the game.
(c) We study the first stage decision of entry by comparing the entrants’
profits in case of entry to their outside option, which is assumed to be equal
to zero. Recall that entrants’ profit when n < (2m
′+1)(a−c)−r(3m′+1)
r(m′+1) amounts
to
(
3(a−c)−r(n+4)
(m′+2)(n+1)
)2
−F . This value is nonnegative if F < F ≤
(
3(a−c)−r(n+4)
(m′+2)(n+1)
)2
.
The interval
(
F,
(
3(a−c)−r(n+4)
(m′+2)(n+1)
)2]
is nonemtpy iffm′ <
(a−c)(n+4)−r(n2+4n+6)
(n+1)(a−c−r) =
m′0. Note thatm
′
0 ≤ 2, hencem′ must not exceed 1 to have a necessary condition
for entry. If m′ = 1 profit of the only entrant amounts to
(
3(a−c)−r(n+4)
3(n+1)
)2
−
F . This value is nonnegative if F < F ≤
(
3(a−c)−r(n+4)
3(n+1)
)2
. The interval(
F,
(
3(a−c)−r(n+4)
3(n+1)
)2]
is nonemtpy iff n <
√
12r(a−c)−11r2−3r
2r . On the contrary,
profit ofm′ entrants when n ≥ (2m′+1)(a−c)−r(3m′+1)
r(m′+1) amounts to
(
1
m′+1K
)2
−F ,
which is negative for any m′ ≥ 1.
From the overall analysis it follows that the SPNE depends on F and n:
1. if F < F ≤
(
3(a−c)−r(n+4)
3(n+1)
)2
and n < n0, then only one entrant decides to
enter and the incumbents decide not to expand the capacity: equilibrium
quantities are K for each no-merged incumbent, 3(a−c)+r(2n−1)3(n+1) for the
merged incumbent and 3(a−c)−r(n+4)3(n+1) for the entrant;
2. if
(
3(a−c)−r(n+4)
3(n+1)
)2
< F ≤ F , no entrant decides to enter, (i) the no-
merged incumbents expand the capacity to produce a−c−2r
n
(which is less
than 2K for any n and higher than K for n < n1) and the merged
incumbent produce a−c+r(n−2)
n
(which is higher than K for any n and less
than 2K for n < n1) for n < n1; (ii) all incumbents produce exactly their
capacity for n ≥ n1.
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(Lemma 4). The game is solved backwards. There are n−1 symmetric incum-
bents Ik with capacityK and whose reaction functionsR
Ik
B
(∑n−2
h=k q
Ih ,
∑
k′ q
E
k′
)
are given by

a−c−r−(
∑
h
qIh+
∑
k′ q
E
k′ )
2 if 0 <
∑
h q
Ih +
∑
k′ q
E
k′ < (n− 1)K,
K if (n− 1)K ≤∑h qIh +∑k′ qEk′ ≤ (n−1)(a−c)+2rn+1 ,
a−c−(
∑
h
qIh+
∑
k′ q
E
k′ )
2 if
∑
h q
Ih +
∑
k′ q
E
k′ > (n−1)(a−c)+2r
n+1 .
(31)
The entrants reaction function is defined as follows:
REB =
a− c− r −
(∑
k q
Ik +
∑
h′ =k′ q
E
h′
)
2
. (32)
(a) We study last stage optimal quantities when m′ entrants decide to enter.
We focus on two cases: all incumbents produce either y or z. In the former
case we have  y = K,qE = a−c−r−(n−1)y−(m′−1)qE2 , (33)
where the reaction function y appears n − 1 times and qE appears m′ times.
The entrant optimal output is derived by (32) and it is equal to 2
m′+1y. To have
the incumbents with output y expression (31) imposes (n− 1)K ≤ (n− 2) y+
m′ 2
m′+1y ≤
(n−1)(a−c)+2r
n+1 , which is satisfied iff n ≥
(m′−1)(a−c)−2m′r
2(m′+1) . When all
incumbents produce z, we have z =
a−c−(n−2)z−m′qE
2 ,
qE = a−c−r−(n−1)z−(m
′−1)qE
2 .
(34)
We get: qE = z − r and z = a−c+m′r
n+m′ . The entrants’ profit is
(
a−c−nr
n+m′
)2
− F .
Note that a−c+m
′r
n+m′ < K iff n <
(m′−1)(a−c)−2m′r
2(m′+1) . This solution is not acceptable
because (i) if m′ ≤ 1, then (m′−1)(a−c)−2m′r2(m′+1) < 0 and n should be negative; (ii)
if m′ > 1, then
(
a−c−nr
n+m′
)2
− F < 0 and we anticipate that none enters.
It follows that if m′ entrants decide to enter and n ≥ (m′−1)(a−c)−2m′r2(m′+1) all
incumbents produce exactly their capacity K and the entrants choose to pro-
duce 2
m′+1K. In such a case entrants’ profit is
(
2
m′+1K
)2
− F . Note that the
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amount
(
2
m′+1K
)2
− F is positive iff m′ < n+3
n+1 , i.e. m
′ = 1, and that K2 − F ,
which represents profit of one entrant if F is maximum, is equal to zero. We
anticipate that only one firm enters in the first stage for any n.
(b) We deduce that after observing entry, in the second stage the incumbents
decide not to expand the available capacity.
(c) We recall that in the first stage one entrant decides to enter because
its profits are not lower than the outside option. It follows that the SPNE is
such that only one entrant decides to enter, the incumbents do not expand the
capacity because they produce K, finally the entrant’s output is also K.
(Proposition 1). If F0 < F ≤ F the value of D (n) when n < n1 is
r2
(
3n4 + 4n3 + 12n2 − 16n− 16
)
− 2r(a− c)
(
2n4 + n3 + 14n2 − 4n− 8
)
2n2(n+ 1)2
+
−(a− c)
2
(
4n3 − 11n2 + 4
)
2n2(n+ 1)2
. (35)
To study the sign of (35) note that the coefficients of both r2 and r (a− c)
are positive, while the one of (a− c)2 it is positive if n ≥ 3. In such a case, we
verify that the coefficient of r2 is lower than the coefficient of r (a− c) and we
remind that r2 ≤ r (a− c) to conclude that D (n) < 0 if n ≥ 3. If n = 2, we
can write
D (2) =
10r2 − 20r(a− c) + (a− c)2
9
, (36)
which is nonnegative under Assumption 2.
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